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The Foetus, His Humanity and His Rights 
Donald De Marco, Ph.D . 
Dr. De Marco is a frequent con-
tributor to Linacre. His current 
article examines the relationship 
of the word " human" and the 
mode of application of that term 
to the foetus. 
Dr. De Marco is a professor at 
St. Jerome's College in Waterloo , 
Ontario. 
We know wha t something is 
when we know its causes. From 
Aristotle to the present, this stric-
ture has remained universally 
respectable. While there have 
been various opinions expressed 
throughout history concerning 
which of Aristotle's four causes 
should be investigated in any giv-
en discipline and how these priv-
ileged causes should be ap-
proached, they have, nonetheless, 
enjoyed a time honored usage, 
providing invaluable objective 
correlatives for a major part of 
Western philosophical and sci -
entific thought. 
We ask the question, "what is '. 
that something which exists with-
in a human mother and develops 
over a nine month period until 
its time of birth?" There is spec-
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ulation that t his something is 
"human." But the word "human" 
seems at once both highly appro-
priate and highly inappropriate. 
Further reflection reveals that the 
word "human" is not always used 
univocally in describing the hu-
man foetus and the human adult ; 
nor is the word "human" used 
univocally in describing a human 
achievement and human hair. 
However, the ambiguity of the 
word "human" is resolved when 
each of its four different senses 
is related to each of the four tra-
ditional Aristotelian causes. In 
this way, the discussion of how 
the word "human" is applied to 
the foetus gains the objective ad-
vantages that a correlation with 
Aristotle's four causes naturally 
provides. 
The four causes represent a 
hierarchic order, the higher causes 
subsuming the lower causes. 
Thus, the final cause, which sets 
into motion the other three causes 
and is said to be the cause of 
causes, subsumes the formal, ma-
terial, and efficient causes; the 
formal cause, for which the mate-
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rial cause exists, subsumes the 
material and efficient causes; the 
material cause, which requires an 
impetus from its immediately 
prior efficient cause in order for 
it to come into being, subsumes 
the efficient cause. 
Four uses of the word "human" 
and their mode of application to 
the foetus are set forth below in 
correlation with each of the four 
causes taken in ascending hier-
archic order. 
As Efficient Cause 
The efficient cause is extrinsic 
to its effect. Also, as immediately 
prior to its effect, it is not, as 
such, directly involved in its ef-
fect's final ordination or perfec-
tion . For these two reasons, the 
efficient cause tells us less about 
its effect than do any of the other 
causes. 
We speak of great art works or 
great engineering feats as "re-
markable human achievements." 
In this way, we distinguish them 
from natural wonders and at-
tribute to them human efficient 
causality. Human art is "human" 
primarily because it is made by 
humans. However, insofar as hu-
mans merely make things, noth-
ing which is materially human 
inheres in what is made. This use 
of the word "human," therefore, 
has no substantial or real appli-
cation to the foetus; it is used 
only to describe an artifact such 
as a model of a human foetus 
which is employed for instruction-
al purposes. 
As Efficient and Material Causes 
The material cause tells us 
about the fundamental intrinsic 
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makeup of a thing. It does not 
specify the form or the nature of 
a being, but describes its compos-
ing parts. 
We speak of human hair, hu-
man skin, or human protoplasm. 
In this sense, the word "human" 
denotes not only something which 
is efficiently caused by a human, 
but something which contains hu-
man matter. Human hair, as well 
as any other human part, con-
tains human substance. 
Properly speaking, the human 
organism produces human parts, 
as the liver produces bile or the 
salivary glands produce saliva. 
Here the word "human" under-
applies to the foetus because the 
foetus is not produced by one hu-
man organism, nor is it a material 
part of a human organism. 
As Efficient, Material, and 
Formal Causes 
The formal cause tells us about 
the specific organization of a be-
ing, its nature or formal constitu-
tion. It tells us more than does 
the material cause by specifying 
how a being's totality is served by 
the functioning of all its material 
parts. 
We speak of a human form to 
denote an empirically identifiable 
human entity, or human organ-
ism. Properly speaking, human 
forms or human orgainsms are 
procreated by human parents. 
The word procreate implies that 
the offspring is more than a ma-
terial part produced by another; 
the offspring enjoys a human, or-
ganismic form of its own. Since 
the foetus is a human form, or a 
human organism, the word "hu-
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man" in its formal sense properly 
applies. 
However, from the foetus's ear-
liest moment of actuality, devel-
opment, or movement, he is under 
the influence of that finality to-
ward which his organismic vitality 
tends him. Hence, he participates, 
to a degree, in a final human form 
that perfects and completes his 
present organismic human form. 
The word "human" in its formal 
sense, therefore, applies properly 
but imperfectly to him. 
As Efficient, Material, Formal, 
and Final Causes 
The final cause adds the note 
of perfection, of completing all 
that the subject is supposed to 
complete. It adds to a form which 
is empirically identifiable as hu-
man a perfection which is nor-
matively identifiable as human. 
We speak of a human being to 
denote one who has everything he 
should have in order to be fully 
human, the adult, the mature per-
son. However, to be absolutely 
precise, there are no perfected hu-
man beings and here the word 
"human" refers to human forms 
who are well on their way toward 
realizing a host of human per-
fections. 
Properly speaking, one perfects 
himself in becoming more truly 
a human being. In this sense, the 
word "human" over-applies to the 
foetus. However, it should be add-
ed that it also somewhat over-
applies to even saints. Nonethe-
less, one is more human the more 
he approximates his final cause, 
the more he identifies with what 
he ought to be. 
The Foetus and Human Rights 
There is no intrinsic dynamic 
tendency that moves from a hu-
man achievement (or artifact) to 
a human part (The Picture of 
Dorian Gray notwithstanding), or 
SUMMARY TABLE 
Cause(s) Uses of the word Verb specifying Mode of appl ica tion 
"Human" the act which to the foet us 
relates the 
cause(s) to its 
(their) "human" 
effect s 
Efficien t h uman achievement makes 
Efficient, Material human part produces 
Efficient, Mater ia l, Formal human fo rm procreates 
Effic ient, Material, Formal, Final human being perfect s 
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not a real applicat ion 
under-application 
p roper application 
(although imperfec t ) 
over-application 
(over-application to 
a mature a dult , a l-
though to a consider-
ably lesser degree) 
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from a human achievement (or 
artifact) to a human form (Pyg-
malion notwithstanding), or from 
a human part t o a human form 
(the formation of Minerva from 
Jupiter's forehead notwithstand-
ing). However, there is an intrin-
sic dynamic tendency within a 
living human form (such as the 
foetus, properly speaking) which 
moves toward a more perfect form 
(the human being, properly speak-
ing) . The foetus as an active hu-
man form tends toward his per-
fection as a more complete human 
being; the empirical human who 
is tends, by his own natural 
weight, to become the normative 
human who ought to be. Because 
of this natural, active tendency in 
humans, from form to finality, we 
say that everyone has a right to 
become what he ought to be. The 
claim to be more perfect, to be-
come what one ought to become, 
is recognized in the very fact of 
that dynamic tendency which ex-
presses itself in the development 
of the human foetus. The foetus, 
from its incipience, is involved in 
his finality; the saint, in the most 
glorious moments of his humani-
ty, does not realize the absolute 
fulfillment of his finality. The 
foetus as well as the saint are 
both, t') borrow Heidegger's ex-
pression, "moving into the near-
ness of distance." 
The rights of the foetus, there-
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fore, are his natural claims to pre-
serve and develop the dynamic 
tendency which is the intrinsic 
expression of his human form, so 
that he is able to participate more 
fully in that finality which is per-
fective of his being. 
Human freedom, then, to quote 
Heidegger once more, is "the let-
ting be of what is." "Letting be" 
allows "what ought to be" to 
emanate; "what is" is the human 
form that presents the claim to be 
what it ought to be. 
In a just and loving, democratic 
society, the human right of the 
foetus to be allowed to become 
more fully human is recognized 
and protected. In an authoritari-
an and power-oriented, totalitari-
an society, this right is neither 
recognized nor protected. 
The fact that the foetus exists 
and develops within a human 
mother, who has human rights of 
her own, complicates the prag-
matics of abortion where there is 
or appears to be a conflict of 
rights between the mother and 
her foetus . However, no degree of 
pragmatic complexity should ob-
scure 1) the real claim the foetus 
has for the recognition and pro-
tection of his human rights and 
2) his status as a human form 
already intimately involved in his 
finality, at once a human form 
and a dynamic process of becom-
ing a more perfect human being. 
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